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In the Shadow of 1984: National
Identification Systems, Computer-
Matching, and Privacy in the
United States
By JOHN SHATTUCK*
There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being
watched at any given moment . . . . It was even conceivable that
they watched everybody all the time. But at any rate they could plug
in your wire whenever they wanted to. You had to live-did live,
from habit that became instinct-in the assumption that every sound
you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement
scrutinized. I
The Diminishing Right of Privacy
The politics and technology represented in George Orwell's 1984
reduced to zero any reasonable expectation of privacy. In late 1984
several political and technological trends in the United States appeared
to be driving toward the same result. In this Commentary I discuss the
privacy implications of some current developments in the public and
private sectors of American society.
Recent actions by the federal government have brought the tech-
nology of privacy invasion from the realm of science fiction into the
world of public policy. For example, in August 1983 it was revealed
that the Internal Revenue Service was planning to estimate the income
of millions of American households, based upon a system of computer-
ized information about "life styles." Such information would be used
to identify persons who fail to pay or who underpay their taxes. The
information would be compiled by private companies and purchased
by the federal government. 2
Another invasion of privacy is made possible by a White House
* Vice President, Harvard University; Director, American Civil Liberties Union,
Washington Office, 1976-1984. B.A., 1965, Yale College; M.A., 1967, Cambridge University;
LL.B., 1970, Yale Law School.
1. G. ORWELL, 1984, at 6-7 (1949).
2. N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1983, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
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directive issued in March 1983, "Safeguarding National Security Infor-
mation," which authorized all federal agencies using classified infor-
mation to require employees to submit to lie detector tests "when
appropriate," and to dismiss or to demote any employee who refuses to
submit.3 The directive eliminated any pretense that lie detectors will be
used only on "volunteers," and has the potential of imposing what Sen-
ator Sam Ervin once called an instrument of "20th Century witch-
craft' 4 on hundreds of thousands of federal employees.
In May 1983 the Justice Department implemented a proposal by
the Secret Service to use the giant National Crime Information Center
(NCIC), a computerized national network, for the dissemination of in-
formation about the non-criminal activities of persons under surveil-
lance by the Secret Service. If the NCIC is used to disseminate non-
criminal "intelligence" files, police in squad cars all over the country
will have routine access on a daily basis to sensitive personal
information.5
An additional source of privacy invasion is the increasing use over
the last several years by the federal government of "computer-match-
ing" investigations to detect fraud, abuse, and waste in the administra-
tion of federal programs. These computerized general searches of
personal data have been conducted in the files of welfare and medicaid
recipients, draft-aged taxpayers, veterans, federal employees, persons
entitled to supplemental security income, and thousands of other gov-
ernment files.6 The computer-matching technique is an effective way
of combining personal data from a wide variety of separate record sys-
tems and using it to keep track of individuals.
Finally, for several years Congress has been considering a propo-
sal to require all persons in the United States to carry a fraud-proof
work authorization card in order to obtain and hold employment2 The
card, backed by a national databank of personal information concern-
3. Safeguarding National Security Information, National Security Directive (Mar. 11,
1983) (copy on fie with Hastings Law Journal). See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1983, § 1, at
1, col. 4.
4. 117 CONG. RPc. 21,997, 22,004-06 (1971).
5. See The United States Secret Service and Its Use of the National Crime Information
Center: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, 43-45 (1983).
6. Oversight of Computer Matching to Detect Fraud and Mismanagement in Govern-
ment Programs- Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of
the Senate Comm on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-76 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Hearingsi.
7. S. 529 & H.R. 1510, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See infra notes 47-55 & accompa-
nying text.
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ing all persons lawfully in the United States, would constitute a secure
national identification system that could block the employment of ille-
gal aliens. The proposal has sparked controversy because the identifi-
cation system could become a vehicle for the violation of civil rights if
used by the police to conduct wide-ranging searches and investigations
or by other government agencies to keep track of private, law-abiding
citizens. 8
These examples demonstrate that the technological capability to
collect, maintain, cross-index, and disclose vast quantities of informa-
tion about private lives has far outpaced the legal protection of privacy
in the United States. Many information systems containing sensitive
data are being constructed to facilitate important social objectives, such
as better law enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more effi-
cient management of credit and insurance programs, improvement of
telecommunications, and streamlining of financial activities. Nonethe-
less, these high technology systems are also being used at an increasing
rate by large public and private agencies to enhance their control of the
lives of individuals.
In recent years the private sector has rapidly increased its use of
such technology. For example, interactive cable television systems are
capable of gathering vast amounts of personal data, not only on the
viewing habits of consumers, but also on their buying and banking
habits, as more services are added to the cable system. Cable compa-
nies, for example, will soon offer burglar alarm systems which will tell
the company when a consumer is at home. This sensitive personal in-
formation is a valuable commodity which cable companies can sell to
credit reporting companies and other interested buyers in order to fi-
nance their corporate growth.9
Private companies as well as the federal government often require
employees to submit to lie detector tests. Employees have no clear un-
derstanding of what rights, if any, they have to refuse to take a test, or
to control the verification, storage, and dissemination of records gener-
ated by a test if they submit to it. 10
The technology for information collection, storage, and retrieval
has outpaced the technology for safeguarding databanks of personal
information. Stories are legion about the fifteen year old computer
8. STAFF OF COMMITTEES ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., U.S. IMMIGRA-
TION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 343-55, 357-64 (Joint Comm. Print 1981).
9. See the proposed privacy protections in S. 66, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 610 (1983).
10. See T. Hayden, Lie Detectors and Employment, Report for the New York Civil
Liberties Union (June 1981).
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wizard who can crack the most secure computer system. Computer se-
curity is largely unregulated, and the penalties for stealing personal
data are unclear."
All of these developments have an impact on the lives of real peo-
ple. Several examples from the files of the American Civil Liberties
Union reveal the Kafkaesque problems that may result from the unreg-
ulated use of personal information:
In New Orleans, a mother on welfare was arrested and jailed for
eighteen hours on the basis of an inaccurate crime report resulting
from programming errors in police computers. She has sued the po-
lice department for false arrest and for failing to audit their comput-
erized files for erroneous information.12
In New York, a middle-aged man was denied a license to drive a
taxi because a computerized credit report showed that when he was
thirteen years old in Massachusetts he temporarily had been placed
in a mental institution. What the files did not show was that he was
an orphan and the institution was the only home the state authorities
could find for him for a period of four years.' 3
In Massachusetts, the medicaid benefits of an elderly woman in
a nursing home were ordered terminated after a computer-match of
welfare rolls and bank accounts in the state revealed that she had an
account above the medicaid assets limit. The termination order was
improper because the woman's bank account contained a certificate
of deposit in trust for a local funeral director, to be used for her fu-
neral expenses, an exempt resource under federal regulations. The
computer-match did not reveal this fact. 14
In Akron, Ohio, five employees of a clothing store were dis-
missed after they were forced to take a psychological stress evalua-
tion test. Following the dismissals the employer spread reports that
the test proved that the employees had been stealing, although none
were ever charged with theft. These reports sharply curtailed further
employment opportunities for them.' 5
The American public is concerned about these developments. The
results of a nationwide poll indicated that in 1979 thirty-three percent
of the public believed that the United States was "very close" or
"somewhat close" to becoming the kind of society "in which the gov-
11. SUBCOMM. ON TRANSPORTATION, AVIATION AND MATERIALS OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., COMPUTER AND COMMUNI-
CATIONS SECURITY AND PRIVACY 17-19, 24-27 (Comm. Print 1984). See also Youths at
Home Tap Nuclear Lab Computer, L.A. Times, Aug. 12, 1983, § 1, at 5, col. 1.
12. Documents on fie at American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana, New Orleans,
Louisiana.
13. A. NEIER, DOSSIER 73-74 (1975).
14. Hearings, supra note 6, at 80 (testimony of John Shattuck, Nat'l Legis. Dir.,
ACLU).
15. T. Hayden, supra note 10.
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emnment knows almost everything about everyone."' 16 Two-thirds of
those polled expressed concern that government agencies, such as the
Internal Revenue Service, and private organizations, such as finance
companies, were violating their privacy.17
Privacy Protection in the United States: A Brief Review of the
Last Two Decades
The constitutional problem concerning the protection of privacy is
the difficulty of applying the principles of an eighteenth-century docu-
ment, the Bill of Rights, to late twentieth-century life. The fourth
amendment to the Constitution was adopted to protect "persons,
houses, papers and effects" against unreasonable search and seizure by
the government. Massive collection and dissemination of sensitive per-
sonal information by private entities was unimagined at that time be-
cause personal information was difficult to collect and files were
handwritten, rarely reproduced, and easily lost. 18 Furthermore, the
fourth amendment generally limited government intrusion to situations
involving criminal investigations.
Today, the capacity to collect and to preserve information has
been radically altered by the relentless growth of an information tech-
nology that permits virtually unlimited permanent storage and retrieval
of personal information. Most personal information is now maintained
outside the home and therefore generally falls outside fourth amend-
ment protection. 19 Individuals have almost no dominion over such in-
formation. They cannot prevent it from being collected; they often
have no access to it and thus cannot challenge its accuracy; and they
cannot prevent its dissemination. As a result, what once was gossip
today may become part of the permanent record.
Over the last two decades, efforts in the United States to secure the
right of personal privacy against modern information practices have
resulted in a string of fragile and generally short-lived victories.
Although the growth of information technology and the corresponding
pressure to make use of that technology have created an increased pub-
lic awareness of privacy issues, few effective limitations have been im-
posed on intrusive governmental or commercial information practices.
Several of the major legislative and judicial developments con-
16. Burnham, Poll Finds Increasing Concern Over Threats to Privacy. N.Y. Times, May
4, 1979, at A19, col. 1.
17. Id.
18. J. SHATTUCK, RIGHTS OF PRIVACY 4-5 (1977).
19. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 151-56 (testimony of Ronald Plesser).
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cerning privacy have compromised privacy interests while appearing to
protect them. For example, a successful battle in Congress against the
creation of a comprehensive national databank in the mid-1960's fos-
tered the growth of a separate personal data system for each federal
agency.20 Information that had been collected for one purpose could
not be used for another purpose. Ultimately, however, as more federal
agencies computerized their records, they informally began to share
and to exchange personal information.21 The increasing use by many
agencies of the social security number, originally intended to be used
solely in administering the social security system, made cross-indexing
among various systems relatively easy. The merger of these apparently
separate personal record systems has therefore become possible without
the creation of physically centralized records. Today, unregulated
computer-matching at all levels of government has created a defacto
national databank.
Similarly, two United States Supreme Court decisions in 196722
sustaining constitutional challenges to warrantless bugging and wire-
tapping quickly led to the enactment in 1968 of a federal statute au-
thorizing various forms of electronic surveillance. 23 In addition, a
proposal for strict procedural controls over the maintenance and dis-
semination of arrest records-suggested in 1969 by Project Search, a
pilot study of the Justice Department's Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration-was shelved as a result of a persistent campaign
waged by the FBI to create a National Crime Information Center in the
early 1970's.24
Short-lived victories for privacy have occurred in the private sector
as well. In 1970 the Fair Credit Reporting Act 25 was proposed as a
result of a strong effort by consumer and civil rights organizations to
regulate the collection and dissemination of information by the credit
reporting industry.26 The Act ratified by Congress, however, was con-
siderably weakened by amendments drafted primarily by the credit re-
20. See D. BURNHAM, THE RISE OF THE COMPUTER STATE 189 (1983); see also A.
MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 204-05
(1971); A. WESTIN & M. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY: COMPUTERS, RECORD
KEEPING, AND PRIVACY 3-4, 14-20 (1972).
21. See generally D. BURNHAM, supra note 20, at 105.
22. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
23. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 212-23 (current ver-
sion at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982)).
24. D. BURNHAM, supra note 20, at 67-69.
25. 84 Stat. 1128-36 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a-1681t (1982)).
26. Fair Credit Reporting- Hearings on S. 823 Before the Subcommr on Financiallnstitu-
tions ofthe Comn on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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porting industry.27
In the post-Watergate era, efforts to ensure the confidentiality of
personal information have gained support in Congress, but have lost it
in the courts. The Supreme Court, in particular, has generally declined
to adapt the protections of the fourth amendment to modem conditions
and has failed to construct a constitutional basis for the protection of
personal privacy.2 8
As part of the Privacy Act of 1974,29 Congress created a Privacy
Protection Study Commission, which issued a report in 1977 calling for
a variety of legislative initiatives.30 In 1976 Congress reacted to the
Supreme Court's refusal to recognize a constitutional right to the pri-
vacy of financial information kept by third parties, particularly
banks,3' by enacting a provision of the Tax Reform Act limiting access
to such information by Internal Revenue Service agents.32 In 1978 the
Right to Financial Privacy Act33 extended the same limitations to all
federal investigations, but added a provision giving agencies the power
to make investigative demands for financial records.34 At the same
time, Congress extended the wiretap provisions of the 1968 Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act by requiring a warrant from a spe-
cial court even for electronic surveillance designed to obtain foreign
intelligence information. 35 In 1980 Congress enacted the Privacy Pro-
tection Act, setting forth a ban on police searches of newsrooms in the
course of investigations in which journalists are suspected of possessing
information about crimes committed by others.36 The same year Con-
gress narrowly defeated other legislation that ensured the confidential-
ity of medical records. 37
Since 1980, however, efforts to initiate privacy legislation in the
Congress have been thwarted by the Reagan Administration. The Of-
fice of Management and Budget, whose director is appointed by the
President, has failed to fulfill its mandate under the Paperwork Reduc-
27. 115 CONG. REC. 33,410 (1969).
28. See generally J. SHATTUCK, supra note 18, at 145-94.
29. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
30. Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society
(July 1977).
31. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
32. 90 Stat. 1667 (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1982)).
33. 92 Stat. 3697-3710 (current version at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1982)).
34. 12 U.S.C. § 3405 (1982).
35. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1783-96 (current version at
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982)).
36. 94 Stat. 1879-83 (current version at 42 U.S.C. 2000aa-2000aa-12 (1982)).
37. S. 865 & H.R. 3444, 96th Cong, 2d Sess. (1980).
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tion Act to propose legislation for the supervision of agency procedures
in this area. 38 The Administration's aggressive and unrestricted use of
lie detector testing, computer-matching, and federal undercover opera-
tions is symptomatic of its attitude toward privacy. 39 In its first two
years the Reagan Administration persuaded Congress to loosen the pri-
vacy protections of individual tax returns held by the IRS and to open
the files of persons in debt to the federal government to credit reporting
companies.4° The Administration also broadened the authority of the
CIA and the FBI to spy on the lawful activities of Americans, 4' sharply
curtailed enforcement of the Privacy Act inside the federal govern-
ment,42 and emasculated the one federal agency charged with develop-
ing privacy protections inside the federal government, the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration.43
The level of privacy protection in the United States today is per-
haps best evidenced by the recent action of the Council of Europe re-
questing that the United States create legal safeguards for personal
data or face the prospect of restrictions by European nations on the
flow of such information into the United States.44 Ignoring this warn-
ing, the Reagan Administration asserted in March 1983 that the Ameri-
can legal structure provides adequate safeguards for the protection of
personal privacy. 45
Toward a National Identification System
There is perhaps no better example of the encroachment on the
rights of privacy and anonymity in the United States than the proposal
to establish a computerized national identification system. This propo-
sal has been put forward as part of the effort to restrict immigration
into the United States.46 In order to accomplish this objective, it is ar-
gued, the United States must implement a comprehensive work-eligi-
bility verification system which would require employees to provide
38. See H.R. REP. No. 455, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28 (1983).
39. D. BURNHAM, supra note 20, at 180-82, 211-13.
40. N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1984, § 1, at 23.
41. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981).
42. Kirchner, A History of Computer Matching in the Federal Government, CoM-
PUTERWORLD, Dec. 14, 1981, In Depth, at 15.
43. See H.R. REP. No. 455, supra note 38.
44. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1983, § 3, at 1, col. 3.
45. See Boston Globe, Mar. 13, 1983, § 1, at 45.
46. S. 529, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 274A (1984).
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documentation of their eligibility to work in the United States.47
The development of a national identification system can be ap-
proached in two different ways. The first approach is to create a coun-
terfeit-resistant identity document, such as an improved version of the
social security card.48 Such a document would contain the bearer's
photograph, signature, perhaps other identifying data, and a code indi-
cating citizen or alien status, all verified by information in government
computers. A second approach would dispense with the identity docu-
ment, relying instead on a government databank of personal informa-
tion filed under individual social security numbers. Employers would
submit a form on each person they seek to employ, which the govern-
ment would compare with the records in the databank.49
How would these identification systems threaten civil liberties?
The greatest danger of any mandatory identity document is that it
tends to become a form of domestic passport. Certainly no one intends
this result, and proponents of the identity card believe that they can
take steps to prevent it.5o What they do not realize, however, is that the
government's police powers to stop and search are already sufficient to
transform the identity document into a major threat to privacy and
freedom of movement.
A review of two Supreme Court decisions of the last decade illus-
trates the point. In 1973 the Court ruled that an officer arresting a mo-
torist for driving without a license may search both the driver and the
car without a warrant.51 In both cases the search was precipitated by
the driver's failure to carry a valid license. Although five years later
the Court struck down random spot checks of drivers' licenses,5 2 it
qualified this holding by distinguishing random searches from searches
conducted at the borders or at specific checkpoints within the coun-
try.5 3 In these cases the Court defined the police power as allowing gov-
ernment agents to stop people without any particular suspicion of a
crime, to request identification, and to search, detain, or arrest people
47. STAFF OF COMMITTEES ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., IST SESS., U.S. IMMIGRA-
TION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 66-69 (Joint Comm. Print 1981).
48. Id at 68.
49. Id.
50. See S. 529, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § C-G (1984) (barring use of national identification
system for purposes other than immigration control).
51. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260
(1973).
52. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1978).
53. Id. at 663.
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who cannot produce proper documents. 54 Thus, because the police
powers to stop and question people and to check identification are al-
ready very broad, a national identity document would serve as a blan-
ket invitation for the police to exercise these powers frequently and to
their fullest extent in the name of immigration control but at the ex-
pense of civil liberties.
The alternative suggestion, a databank without an identity card,
also has the potential to be abused. If such a databank is to serve as a
reliable means of checking employment eligibility, it must contain cur-
rent and verified personal information on each person authorized to
work. In addition to the social security number and other items com-
monly used to establish identity, this information would probably in-
lude a physical description such as height, coloring, and race, perhaps
some unique identifier such as a signature or photograph or even fin-
gerprints, and a notation of status as a citizen or alien with permission
to work.
The history of computerized data systems over the last decade
shows one clear trend. they have always been adapted to purposes
other than their originally intended use. There are dozens of examples
of new uses for once-restricted personal data systems:55
Social Security Administration files are now used routinely to
identify "illegal aliens."
The federal Parent Locator Service allows child support enforce-
ment officials to search virtually all government and private record
systems in order to trace absent pareits who owe child support.
Numerous state laws allow or actually require public and pri-
vate employers to use criminal history databanks, compiled origi-
nally for police use, in order to screen out applicants convicted of
certain crimes, or simply to ascertain if applicants have arrest
records.
Internal Revenue Service records are now used to screen pro-
spective jurors and to locate non-registrants for the draft.
The records of hundreds of federal and state public assistance
programs have been matched against each other and against public
and private employment rolls, to identify people receiving multiple
benefits or benefits for which they are ineligible because of their
earnings.
Although the expanded uses of personal data cited above are for
purposes that most people would find rational and even commendable,
54. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1978).
55. See The Social Security Number as a Universal Identifier: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 96-
123 (1982) (statement of John Shattuck, Nat'l Legis. Dir., ACLU).
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the examples demonstrate that personal data systems often are adapted
to a wide variety of purposes beyond their originally intended uses.
A national identification system established to enforce the immi-
gration laws is likely to follow the same course. A system set up to
determine eligibility for employment on grounds of citizenship or alien
status could easily be adapted, for example, to implement a law re-
stricting the employment of convicted felons for certain kinds of jobs;
such convictions could simply be coded into the system's database.
The identification system could also be useful in efforts to combat wel-
fare fraud. If the database were expanded to include a notation of sta-
tus as a welfare recipient, then the databank could automatically
identify any welfare recipients who obtain employment and notify the
appropriate welfare agency to cut off benefits. If the system included
identifiers such as photographs, it could be used, for example, to iden-
tify nuclear freeze demonstrators or members of supposed communist-
front organizations.
In sum, a national identification system for controlling immigra-
tion could quickly become a major instrument for tracking and control-
ling the private lives of millions of citizens.
Computer-Matching: H-igh-Tech Invasion of Privacy
A national identification system may or may not be adopted in the
United States. However, a similar concept, computer-matching-the
use of unrelated computer tapes of massive numbers of personal files to
conduct government or corporate investigations-has arrived. To un-
derstand the impact of computer-matching on civil liberties, it is neces-
sary to grasp the profound difference between a computer-match
investigation and a traditional law enforcement investigation.
A traditional investigation is triggered by some evidence that the
person targeted has engaged in wrongdoing. The limited resources of
law enforcement usually make it impracticable to conduct dragnet in-
vestigations. Moreover, the American constitutional system generally
bars the government from conducting intrusive investigations of per-
sons it does not suspect of wrongdoing.56
A computer-match is not bound by these limitations. It is directed
not at an individual, but at an entire category of persons, not because
any of them is suspected of misconduct, but because the category is of
interest to the government. What makes computer-matching so funda-
mentally different from a traditional investigation is that its purpose is
56. See generally J. SHATTUCK, supra note 18, at 1-45.
July 1984]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
to generate the evidence of wrongdoing that usually is required before
a traditional investigation can be initiated. That evidence is produced
by "matching" two sets of personal records compiled for wholly unre-
lated purposes.
The impact of a computer-match on civil liberties differs in at least
four ways from that of a conventional law enforcement investigation.
The first difference is its impact on fourth amendment rights. The
fourth amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures,
the most blatant of which have been fishing expeditions directed at
large numbers of people on the chance that something will turn up.
From the royal writs of assistance used in the eighteenth century for the
enforcement of oppressive British tax and tariff laws57 to the municipal
code inspections used today for the enforcement of health and safety
standards, 58 American law has firmly held to the principle that genera-
lized fishing expeditions violate the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. Although searches of personal records are not
physically intrusive, as are door-to-door searches of houses, the result is
the same: a massive investigation using private information about
huge numbers of people.
That brings us to a second principle of individual rights that is
squarely at odds with computer-matching. Generally, people in the
United States are not forced to bear a continuous burden of demon-
strating to the government that they are innocent of wrongdoing.59
Although people are obliged to obey the law, the presumption of inno-
cence is intended to protect them against having to prove that they are
free from guilt whenever the government chooses to investigate them.
Computer-matching can turn the presumption of innocence into a
presumption of guilt. In Massachusetts thousands of welfare recipients
were summarily removed from the state welfare rolls in 1982 due to a
computer-match of welfare records with bank accounts in the state, and
many had to fight for reinstatement based on information the state ne-
glected to take into account after their names appeared as "hits" in the
match.60 A similarly striking example of this "presumption of guilt"
occurred four years ago in Florida, when the state's attorney for the
57. J. SHATrUCK, supra note 18, at 3.
58. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See also J. SHATrUCK, supra note
18, at 31.
59. The presumption of innocence is a fundamental element of Anglo-American crimi-
nal law and procedure. See J. GoRA, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 1-15 (1977).
60. Hearings, supra note 6, at 78, 80, 83 (testimony of John Shattuck, Nat'l Legis. Dir.,
ACLU).
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Jacksonville area obtained the case files for all food-stamp recipients in
the area and then launched fraud investigations against those who had
received allotments of $125 or more per month. A federal court of ap-
peals invalidated the file search and enjoined the investigation on the
ground that the food-stamp recipients were put in the impossible and
unfair position of having to prove that the food-stamps they had re-
ceived were not obtained by fraud.61
The third way in which computer-matching erodes civil liberties
involves the most important principle governing the collection and use
of personal information by the government: the individual has a right
to control information about himself and to prevent its use without his
consent for purposes unrelated to those for which it was collected. This
principle is embodied in the Privacy Act of 1974.62 The Privacy Act
restricts disclosure by federal agencies of personally identifiable infor-
mation, unless the subject consents. A major exception to this rule is
disclosure for a "routine use," which is defined as "the use of [a] record
for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was
collected." 63
When computer-matching was in its infancy at the federal level,
the Privacy Act was correctly perceived by several federal agencies to
be a major stumbling block. Thus, in 1977 the Civil Service Commis-
sion balked at the plans of Joseph Califano, Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare in the Carter Administration, to institute a match of
federal employee records and state welfare rolls, on the ground that the
use of employee records for such a purpose would violate the Privacy
Act.64 But this assessment of the Privacy Act soon gave way to a suc-
cession of strained administrative interpretations by agencies seeking to
square computer-matching with the Act's prohibition of the use of per-
sonal records unless the purpose is compatible with that for which they
were collected.65 Because enforcement of the Privacy Act is left almost
entirely to the federal agencies themselves, it is hardly surprising that
they have bent the Act to their own purposes and have now miracu-
lously established that any computer-matching is a "routine use" of
personal records. 66 All that is required to satisfy the policy of the Act,
the agencies say, is to publish each new computer-matching "routine
61. Roberts v. Austin, 632 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 975 (1981).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
63. Id § 552a(a)(7).
64. Hearings, supra note 6, at 122 (letter from Charles Goodman, Gen. Counsel, U.S.
Civil Service Comm'n, to Charles Ruff, Acting Deputy Inspector Gen., HEW).
65. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 104.
66. Kirchner, supra note 42, at 15.
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use" in the Federal Register.67 Thus, the safeguards of the Privacy Act
have been effectively eroded.
The final civil liberties issue raised by computer-matching involves
due process of law. Once a match has taken place it results in a series
of "raw hits." At this point all persons identified as "hits" are in jeop-
ardy of being found guilty of wrongdoing. To the extent that they are
not given notice of their situation and an adequate opportunity to con-
test the results of the match, they are denied due process of law.68
Precisely this result has occurred in several of the best known
matching programs conducted to date. The results of Secretary
Califano's Project Match were kept secret from the federal employees
whose records were matched with welfare rolls, because the Justice De-
partment viewed the investigation as "a law enforcement program,
designed to detect suspected violations of various criminal statutes. '69
For this reason the Department ordered the Civil Service Commission
not to notify any of the federal employees whose names showed up as
"hits," since "It]he premature discussion of a specific criminal matter
with a putative defendant is in our view inimical to the building of a
solid prosecutorial case."' 70 In Massachusetts the welfare authorities
went one step further by terminating benefits of persons showing up as
"hits" without even conducting an internal investigation of the accuracy
of the computer-match results.71
Conclusion
Franz Kafka would feel quite at home in the world of computer-
matching, national identification systems, and other technological and
bureaucratic instruments of privacy invasion that are coming into use
in the United States. The growing public interest in regulating these
new technologies to protect the integrity of the individual may exert
political pressure to check this disturbing trend. In this respect the
words of those who drafted the Privacy Act of 1974 provide both a
warning and a hope:
[I]f one reads Orwell. carefully, one realizes that "1984" is a state
of mind. In the past, dictatorships always have come with hobnailed
67. Id
68. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969) (welfare recipients are entitled to
notice and hearing before termination of benefits).
69. Hendricks, How Not to Catch Welfare Cheaters, Washington Post, July 1, 1979, § C,
at 8, col. 1. See also Kirchner, supra note 42, at 7, 10.
70. Letter from Benjamin Civiletti, Asst. Attorney Gen., to Raymond Jacobson, Civil
Service Comm'n Exec. Dir. (October 7, 1977). See Kirchner, supra note 42, at 10.
71. Hearings, supra note 6, at 129-39 (affidavit of Allan G. Rodgers).
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boots and tanks and machineguns, but a dictatorship of dossiers, a
dictatorship of data banks can be just as repressive, just as chilling
and just as debilitating [to] our constitutional protections. 72
72. S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974).
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